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Case No. 20100003-CA 
INTHE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff / Appellee, 
vs. 
John Vernon Cecil, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from convictions for aggravated assault, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 & 103 (West 2004): criminal 
mischief, a third degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (West 
Supp. 2008); and and reckless driving, a class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6a-528 (West Supp. 2008) This Court has jurisdiction under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Defendant raises seven claims in his brief. Defendant's appellate counsel 
designates the first two claims [claims IA and IB] as "claims which counsel believes 
have merit." Br. Appellant at 17 (boldface, capitalization, and underlining omitted). 
These claims both address the sufficiency of the evidence on the criminal mischief 
charge. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Defendant designates the next five claims [claims IIA through HE] as "claims 
raised by the defendant/' Id. at 20 (boldface, capitalization, and underlining 
omitted). Counsel argues that claims IIA and IIC lack merit and addresses them as 
he would in an Anders brief. Id. at 17, 20-21,25-26; see also Anders v. California, 386 
U.S. 738 (1967). Counsel argues that Defendant's remaining five claims — IA, IB, IIB, 
IID, and HE —may have merit, but he does not adequately brief any of them. 
1. Did the trial court correctly deny Defendant's motion to dismiss the 
criminal mischief charge, where the State presented evidence that Defendant 
intended to hit and damage both the victim and the property shielding him? 
Standard of Review. "The grant or denial of a motion to dismiss is a question of 
law," reviewed "for correctness." State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f 17, 70 P.3d 111 
(citations and internal quotation omitted). 
2. Was the evidence sufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict on the 
criminal mischief charge, where the evidence supported a finding that Defendant 
intended to hit and damage both the victim and the property shielding him? 
Standard of Review. "The standard of review for a sufficiency claim is highly 
deferential to a jury verdict." State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, f 29,122 P.3d 639. In 
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court views the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict and will reverse only if the Court determines 
2 
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that "reasonable minds could not have reached the verdict/' See id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
3. Should this Court review the five claims designated as "Defendant's 
claims," where appellate counsel either concedes they are meritless or inadequately 
briefs them? 
Standard of Review. No standard of review applies to this question. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following relevant statutes are included in the Addendum: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-105 (West 2004) (transferred intent); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (West 2004) (assault); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (West 2004) (aggravated assault); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (West Supp. 2008) (criminal mischief). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Summary of the facts. 
1. The prosecution's version, 
a. The first assault. 
On March 30,2009, Michael Paul Stevens was driving a 1992 Chevrolet Blazer 
in Washington City. R112:177,182. He was also talking on his cell phone. R112:178. 
When he dropped the phone, he pulled off to the right side of the road to pick it up. 
Id. As he began to talk on the phone again, he looked up to see Defendant and 
Anjelica Quintero accelerating toward him in Anjelica's late 1970's blue Chevrolet 
truck. Id. Anjelica was Stevens7 former girlfriend, and he recognized the truck. Id. 
• 3 
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at 179. Stevens sped off. Id. Defendant, who was driving, caught up with Stevens 
and passed him. Id. at 181. Stevens slowed down. Id. Defendant "screeched on the 
brakes, came to a stop and then put [the truck] in reverse/7 Id. Defendant then sped 
backwards trying to hit Stevens. Id. Stevens maneuvered out of the way and 
proceeded down the street. Id. at 181-82. 
b. The second assault. 
Stevens traveled to a nearby Chevron station where his former step-brother 
operated a repair business called Lug Nuts. Id. at 182,185,298. Stevens parked his 
car near a car hoist. Id. Defendant and Anjelica followed him. Id. at 183. 
Defendant stopped the blue truck about ten or fifteen feet from Stevens. Id. at 184. 
Stevens got out of the Blazer, stood behind the hoist, and put up his hands to signal 
"What's going on?" Id. at 183-85. Defendant "then stepped on the gas and just 
came full speed and crashed right into . . . the car hoist." Id. at 184. If the hoist had 
not been there, Stevens would have been hit. Id. at 185. Defendant "backed up and 
then sped off down the street." Id. 
Stephens' former step-brother, Todd Evans, heard the crash and came out to 
see what was happening. Id. at 185. Defendant told him to call the police, "that this 
guy just tried to run me over and hit the hoist." Id. at 186. 
4 
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c. The third assault 
As Todd was on the phone with dispatch, Defendant suddenly returned. Id. 
at 187. Defendant drove the truck back around the corner and "bolted right into the 
gas station . . . like he was trying to hit [Stevens]/7 Id. at 187. Stevens heard the 
truck accelerating towards him. Id. He had "enough time to just brace [himself] on 
the front of the truck and use that to push [himself] away/7 Id. at 187-88. And then 
Defendant left. Id. at 188. 
2. Defendant's version. 
Defendant did not testify. R46. His version of the events was presented 
through the testimony of investigating officer Christopher Ray. See R112:289-331. 
Defendant and Anjelica also called dispatch on the day of the incident, and Officer 
Ray met with them at Anjelica's apartment in response to their call. See id. at 291-93 
Defendant told Officer Ray that as he and Anjelica drove into Washington 
City, they saw Stevens7 car at the Chevron. Id. at 294. They did not want Stevens to 
know where they lived because of "some threats that had been made recently.77 Id. 
So they drove around, hoping Stevens would leave the area. Id. When some time 
had passed, they approached Anjelica's neighborhood. Id. at 295. They saw Stevens 
parked near the entrance to her complex. Id. So they continued driving back 
toward the Chevron station, passing Stevens on the way. Id. Defendant and 
Anjelica told the officer that Stevens began to chase them. Id. at 296. They said 
5 
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Stevens chased them around the pumps and along the back side of the station. Id. 
They said Stevens pulled in front of them, exited his car, and began to approach 
them in an aggressive manner. Id. at 297. Both could see a black semi-automatic 
handgun stuck through the front waistband of Stevens' pants. Id. 
Officer Ray left Defendant and Anjelica to fill out their written statements. Id. 
at 298. He then responded to Todd's call to dispatch, traveling to the Chevron 
station to get Todd's and Stevens' side of the story. Id. at 298-300. After talking to 
them, Officer Ray returned to Anjelica's home. Id. at 311. 
Defendant and Anjelica had prepared their written statements. Id. at 311. 
Their statements told a story different from the verbal accounts they had earlier 
given Officer Ray. Id. at 313. In their written accounts, they no longer said that 
Stevens had chased them. Id. Rather, they said that they had followed Stevens to 
get his license plate number. Id. Officer Ray asked Defendant why he had not told 
him about hitting the hoist. Id. at 314. Defendant said that he had forgotten. Id. 
Defendant also admitted that he had tried to hit Stevens two different times, stating 
that he felt"threatened by Mr. Stevens because of the threats made in the past" and 
that therefore he "was in fear for [his] life." Id. at 314-15. Defendant claimed that 
when Stevens exited the car, Defendant saw that Stevens had a handgun, feared for 
his own life, and tried to hit Stevens. Id. at 315. Asked why he had not mentioned 
the gun in his call to dispatch, Defendant blamed the dispatcher, saying that the 
6 
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dispatcher would not give him time to explain. Id. at 316. Asked about passing 
Stevens and slamming on his brakes, Defendant admitted to that, but again claimed 
that he "was in fear for [his] life,... protecting [himself]/7 Id. 
3. Todd Evans' account. 
Todd Evans, Stevens' step-brother, testified that he was working that day, 
heard a loud bang, and walked out to see Stevens standing near the hoist and the 
blue truck backing up. Id. at 236-37. Stevens told Todd to call 911 and said "[t]hey 
just hit your hoist/7 Id. at 237. While trying to call 911, Todd heard an engine roar, 
saw a blue truck entering the property, heard Defendant "revving [the] engine as 
hard as [Todd] could imagine it being revved." Id. at 240-41. He then saw 
Defendant crank the wheel hard to the left, saw "intense anger" in Defendant's face, 
and saw Defendant as he passed very closely and sped toward Stevens, revving the 
engine and driving so close that Stevens had to shove himself off the blue truck. Id. 
at 241-43. 
4. Anjelica Quintero's account 
Anjelica testified that she and Defendant were coming home when they saw 
Stevens. Id. at 341. Defendant followed Stevens, veered in front of him, slammed 
on the breaks, and started driving backwards as if to hit Stevens' Blazer. Id. at 342. 
Defendant and Anjelica then followed Stevens to the Chevron station. Id. at 343. 
When Stevens parked behind the station and exited his car, Defendant "floored it 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and tried to hit him." Id. Stevens jumped out of the way, and they slammed into 
the lift Id. Stevens had no gun. Id. 
Anjelica testified that she had lied in her written statement because Defendant 
"wanted our testimonies on our statements to match, and . . . he had me, word for 
word, write what he wanted on the statement." Id. 
B. Summary of the proceedings. 
The State charged Defendant with two counts of aggravated assault and one 
count each of criminal mischief, reckless driving, and failure to stop at the scene of 
an accident involving property damage. R25-26 (amended information); see also 
R27. 
After the State rested at trial, Defendant moved to dismiss all the charges. 
R112:379. The court dismissed the charge for failure to stop at the scene of an 
accident. R46-47; R113:431. The court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss the 
other charges. R112:379-392; R113:431. The jury found Defendant guilty of one 
count each of aggravated assault, criminal mischief, and reckless driving. R45. The 
jury found Defendant not guilty on the second count of aggravated assault. Id. 
The trial court sentenced Defendant to five-years-to-life prison terms on his 
convictions for aggravated assault and criminal mischief and to a six-month jail 
term on his reckless driving conviction. R93-94. The court ordered that Defendant's 
8 
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sentence on the aggravated assault conviction run consecutively to his other 
sentences. Id. 
Defendant timely appealed. R106. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant presents two claims designated "the defendant's claims which 
counsel believes have merit/7 Defendant claims that the trial court erred by denying 
his motion to dismiss the criminal mischief charge at the close of the State's case. He 
also claims that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict on 
that charge. Defendant cannot prevail on these claims. The State's evidence 
included testimony that Defendant chased Michael Stevens into the Chevron station 
lot and followed him to the back of the station. When Stevens got out of his vehicle 
and stood behind a car hoist, Defendant stepped on the gas and crashed full speed 
into the car hoist. This evidence and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn 
from it suffice to support a jury finding that Defendant intended to hit the hoist and 
therefore justify the court's denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss. 
Defendant presents five other issues designated "the claims raised by the 
defendant." Counsel treats two of these claims as Anders claims, conceding they 
lack merit and explaining why. The State concurs in counsel's analysis that the 
claims lack merit. 
9 
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Defendant suggests that the other three claims may have merit, but does not 
adequately brief them. This Court should therefore deny review of those claims. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED THE MOTION TO 
DISMISS THE CRIMINAL MISCHIEF CHARGE 
(response to Defendant's claim IA) 
Defendant first claims that the "trial court erred in denying [his] motion to 
dismiss the charge of criminal mischief." Br. Appellant at 17 (boldface and 
underlining omitted). Defendant asserts that the State presented no evidence that 
he "intentionally damaged, defaced, or destroyed the hoist." Id. at 18 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). He claims that the evidence showed only that he 
"attempted to hit Mr. Stevens with a vehicle and missed and hit the hoist." Id. 
Defendant cannot prevail on this claim because his intent to hit the hoist can be 
reasonably inferred from his actions and the surrounding circumstances. 
Background, In arguing his motion to dismiss below, Defendant claimed 
that the State had to prove that he intentionally damaged the hoist. R112:384. He 
claimed below, as he now claims on appeal, that there was testimony that Defendant 
intended to hit Stevens, but not that he intended to hit the hoist. Id. The trial court 
denied the motion, holding there was sufficient evidence of intent. Id. at 387. 
10 
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Relevant law. A defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficient evidence at 
the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief requires the trial court to determine 
whether the prosecution presented sufficient evidence of each element of the 
offense. See State v. Spainhower, 1999 UT App 280, % 4, 988 P.2d 452. "Evidence is 
sufficient, and the denial of a motion to dismiss proper, if 'the evidence and all 
inferences that can be reasonably drawn from it [establish that] some evidence exists 
from which a reasonable jury could find that the elements of the crime had been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt." See id. (quoting State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 
1225 (Utah 1989) (alterations in Spainhower)). 
Defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury's 
finding that he committed criminal mischief. A person commits criminal mischief 
where he "intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of another." 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106(2)(c). Thus, to prevail on his motion to dismiss, 
Defendant was required to show that there was no basis in the evidence from which 
a reasonable jury could find that he intentionally damaged or destroyed the hoist. 
Because this is a "fact-sensitive" question, challenging the trial court's ruling 
requires that Defendant marshal the evidence that supports it. See State v. Chavez-
Espinoza, 2008 UT App 191, % 20,186 P.3d 1023 ("In order to challenge a jury verdict 
or denial of a motion to dismiss, the challenging party must marshal the evidence in 
support of the jury's verdict and the trial court's findings."); see also Kimball v. 
11 
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Kimball, 2009 UT App 233, f 22,217 P.3d 733 ("'Even where [a defendant] purports] 
to challenge only the legal ruling, as here, if a determination of the correctness of a 
court's application of a legal standard is extremely fact-sensitive, the defendant^ 
also ha[s] a duty to marshal the evidence.'7) (citation omitted). 
A, This Court should not review Defendant's claim because he has 
not marshaled the evidence. 
Defendant has not met his marshaling burden. Defendant claims summarily 
that the "plaintiffs evidence was limited to the alleged fact that the defendant 
attempted to hit Mr. Stevens with a vehicle and missed and hit the hoist." Br. 
Appellant at 18. He cites only to R112:384-388, which is trial counsel's argument on 
the issue. 
This does not suffice. The marshaled evidence includes testimony that 
Defendant aimed at Stevens, who stood behind the hoist, and sped into the hoist. 
See R112:184. Stevens testified that he got out of his car and stood "right behind" 
the hoist. R112:185. He testified that while he was standing there, Defendant 
"stepped on the gas and just came full speed and crashed right into . . . the car 
hoist" R112-.184. 
This is not testimony that Defendant missed Stevens and accidentally hit the 
hoist. This is evidence that Defendant intentionally hit the hoist in an attempt to 
reach and hit Stevens. Defendant was required to marshal this evidence, but did 
not. This Court should deny Defendant's claim for this reason alone. 
12 
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B. The State presented some evidence from which a reasonable jury 
could find that Defendant intentionally damaged or destroyed the 
hoist. 
Even if this Court excuses Defendant's marshaling failure, the trial court 
properly denied the motion to dismiss the criminal mischief charge. As explained, 
the State presented Stevens' testimony that as he stood behind the hoist, Defendant 
stepped on the gas and crashed into the hoist. See id. This is evidence from which 
the jury could reasonably infer that Defendant intended to hit the hoist. '"[T]he 
intent to commit [an offense] is a state of mind, which is rarely susceptible of direct 
proof,... can be inferred from conduct and attendant circumstances in the light of 
human behavior and experience/" State v. Robertson, 2005 UT App 419,122 P.3d 895 
(quoting State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878,888 (Utah 1981)); see also State v. Colwell, 2000 
UT 8, f 43, 994 P.2d 177. 
Defendant admitted that he intended to hit Stevens. See R112:314-15. The 
jury could have inferred from that admission and from testimony about Defendant's 
conduct that Defendant also intended to hit the hoist in order to reach Stevens. The 
prosecution, in fact, argued this inference to the trial court. See R112:386-87. The 
trial court found that the evidence sufficed to support a jury's finding on the basis 
that Defendant intended to damage the hoist. See id. at 387. 
Defendant ignores that ruling and its analytical basis. He claims that he 
"inadvertently hit the hoist." Br. Appellant at 20. The State's evidence provided a 
13 
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basis for a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant did intend to hit 
the hoist. This Court should therefore affirm the trial court's ruling denying 
Defendant's motion to dismiss.1 
Defendant also argues that the ''transferred intent" statute does not apply. Id. 
at 18; see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-105. He claims that the intent to hit Stevens 
cannot be transferred to establish intent to hit the hoist. Br. Appellant at 18,20. He 
argues that the intent to hit a person may be transferred only to establish intent to 
hit another person, not to establish intent to hit or damage property. Id. 
This is a red herring. The State does not argue that Defendant's intent to hit 
Stevens established the intent to hit the hoist. Nor did the prosecutor below. The 
1
 Defendant's motivation may not have been to damage or destroy the hoist. 
His motivation may have simply been to reach and hit Stevens. But the criminal 
mischief statute does not require the State to prove motivation. Rather, it requires 
the State to prove intent. And the State presented evidence from which the jury 
could reasonably have inferred that Defendant intended to hit the hoist in order to 
reach and hit Stevens. 
14 
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prosecutor below argued, as the State does now, that Defendant intended to hit the 
hoist in order to reach Stevens. See R112:386. 
IL 
THE EVIDENCE SUFFICED TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S FINDING 
DEFEND ANT GUILTY OF CRIMINAL MISCHIEF 
(response to Defendant's claim IB) 
Defendant next claims that the evidence was insufficient to "support the 
jury's verdict finding the defendant guilty of the charge of criminal mischief." Br. 
Appellant at 19 (boldface and underlining omitted). Where the defense presented 
no testimony, this claim simply replicates Defendant's claim regarding the 
insufficiency of the evidence to withstand the motion to dismiss addressed in 
Point I. Defendant cannot prevail on this claim because, as demonstrated, the 
evidence was not so inconclusive that a reasonable jury must have entertained a 
doubt that Defendant committed criminal mischief. 
2
 The prosecutor did reference the transferred intent statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-2-105, during his argument on the motion to dismiss. See R112:381-82. The 
prosecutor argued that Defendant's intent to hit Stevens could be transferred to 
establish intent to hit Stevens' step-brother, Todd Evans, and therefore to establish 
intent for purposes of the second aggravated assault count. See R112:381-83. That 
count was based on Defendant's narrowly missing Evans when he returned to the 
Chevron station and admittedly tried to hit Stevens with his truck. See R77. 
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A. This Court should not review Defendant's claim because he has 
not marshaled the evidence. 
Here again, Defendant has not marshaled the evidence. Because a claim that 
the evidence is insufficient to support a verdict challenges a jury's factual finding, 
an appellant making the claim "must marshal the evidence in support of the verdict 
and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in a light most 
favorable to the verdict." State v. White, 2011 UT App 162, f 7, 258 P.3d 594 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Defendant's two paragraph argument does not cite to the record let alone 
marshal the evidence supporting the jury's verdict. Again, Defendant does not 
marshal Stevens' critical testimony that as he stood behind the hoist, Defendant 
aimed the truck at him and crashed into the hoist. Compare Br. Appellant at 19-20 
with R112-.184-85. 
B. The evidence sufficed to support the jury's verdict of guilty on the 
criminal mischief count 
Moreover, Defendant cannot prevail on the merits. "The standard of review 
for a sufficiency claim is highly deferential to a jury verdict." Workman, 2005 UT 66, 
f 29. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the Court must view the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See id. The Court will reverse the 
jury's decision only if it determines "that reasonable minds could not have reached 
the verdict." See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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As explained, Stevens testified that Defendant tried to hit him with the blue 
truck as Stevens stood behind the hoist R112:183-85. Based on this conduct, the 
jury could have reasonably found that Defendant intended to hit the hoist in order 
to reach Stevens. 
III. 
THIS COURT NEED NOT ADDRESS THE ISSUES DESIGNATED 
AS "CLAIMS RAISED BY THE DEFENDANT"; APPELLATE 
COUNSEL EITHER CONCEDES THAT THE CLAIMS ARE 
MERITLESS OR INADEQUATELY BRIEFS THEM. 
(response to Defendant's claim IIA to HE) 
A. As appellate counsel concedes, Defendant was not entitled to a 
mistrial after a juror saw him briefly in the hallway at a time when 
he was wearing handcuffs. 
Defendant requested a mistrial below because a juror inadvertently saw him 
in the hallway at a time when he was wearing handcuffs. See R112:271. The trial 
court called the juror into chambers and questioned her about the incident. 
R112:281. She testified that the bailiff opened the door into the hallway, she saw 
Defendant, and she just put her head down and did not make eye contact. Id. at 282. 
Asked about the incident, she said that nothing was said and the incident caused 
her no concerns. Id. The trial court denied Defendant's motion for a mistrial. Id. 
Appellate counsel concedes that Defendant was not entitled to a new trial 
because he suffered no prejudice. See Br. Appellant at 20-21 (citing State v. Wetzel, 
868 P.2d 64, 70 (Utah 1993) (brief and fortuitous encounter of the defendant in 
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handcuffs outside the courtroom does not dilute presumption of innocence and 
does not require reversal absent evidence of actual prejudice)). Defense counsel 
concedes that the record lacks evidence showing actual prejudice. Id. at 21. 
The State concurs in counsel's analysis. 
B. Counsel has not adequately briefed Defendant's claim that the 
trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence of past convictions, 
currently pending charges, etc., to impeach the testimony of a 
prosecution witness. 
Appellate counsel has not adequately briefed Defendant's claim that the trial 
court erred in excluding evidence of past convictions, currently pending charges, 
and an ex parte stalking order against Stevens. Accordingly, this Court should not 
address it. 
An "appellate court is not "a depository in which [a party] may dump the 
burden of argument and research/" Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, f 9,194 P.3d 903 
(citation omitted). When a party does nothing more than "cursorily" raise an issue, 
this Court should "decline[ ] to address" it on appeal. State v. Arave, 2009 UT App 
278, f 12 n.3, 220 P.3d 182, cert, granted, 225 P.3d 880 (Utah 2010); see also State v. 
Green, 2005 UT 9, f 11,108 P.3d 710 ("A brief which does not fully identify, analyze, 
and cite its legal arguments may be disregarded or stricken by the court"). 
Here, appellate counsel has not identified the evidence Defendant asked to 
introduce, nor has he addressed the trial court's reasoning. See Br. Appellant at 21-
25. He has not addressed the trial court's ruling that much of the evidence he 
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sought to introduce was irrelevant or at least more prejudicial than probative. See 
id.) R.112:192,198,199,200,202,206,212-14. He has not attempted to explain why 
the trial court's ruling on those matters was improper. See id. Moreover, he has not 
addressed the parts of the evidence that the court agreed could be admitted because 
they were probative and not unfairly prejudicial. See id.; see also R112:200,207,208. 
And he has not tried to explain why the portions of the evidence admitted were 
insufficient to adequately impeach Stevens. See id. 
Rather, Defendant has "dump[ed] the burden of argument and research" on 
this Court and opposing counsel. Allen, 2008 UT 56, f 9. Because Defendant's claim 
is inadequately briefed, this Court should not address it. 
C As appellate counsel concedes, the trial court correctly overruled 
Defendant's objection to jury instructions 11 and 12. 
Defendant objected below to jury instructions 11 and 12. R112:355,363. He 
claimed that the instructions incorrectly permitted the jury to find him guilty of 
aggravated assault on the basis of an intentional, knowing, or reckless mental state. 
See id. at 356-60. He argued that aggravated assault required an intentional mental 
state. See id. 
Appellate counsel concedes that the trial judge was correct in overruling the 
objection. See Br. Appellant at 25-26. He cites In re McElhaney, 579 P.2d 328 (Utah 
1978), for its holding that "intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to 
establish criminal liability" for the dangerous weapon version of aggravated assault. 
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Id. at 26. That case follows the relevant statutes. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 & 
103. Thus, the challenged instructions are correct. 
The State concurs in counsel's analysis. 
D. Counsel has not adequately briefed Defendant's claim that the 
trial counsel was ineffective for not interviewing or subpoenaing 
certain witnesses and for not acquiring certain tape recordings. 
Defendant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not interviewing or 
subpoenaing certain witnesses allegedly identified by Defendant and for not 
acquiring and offering into evidence certain alleged tape recordings of 
conversations between [him] and the alleged victim. See Br. Appellant at 27-29. 
Defendant has not adequately briefed this argument. Other than setting forth 
the law regarding ineffective assistance of counsel— that a defendant must 
demonstrate deficient performance and prejudice—Defendant has not cited any 
authority to support his claim. Moreover, he has not once cited to the record below 
or to any evidence that trial counsel knew or should have known about such 
witnesses or tapes. Even on appeal, he has not identified what witnesses should 
have been called, what they might have testified, and how that testimony would 
have made a difference in his case. Nor has he explained what tapes he is talking 
about, what evidence they contained, or how the tapes would have made a 
difference in the outcome. Defendant merely speculates that "[h]ad trial counsel 
obtained and evaluated the recordings, and had the recordings contained 
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exculpatory evidence or evidence supporting [his] self defense claim/' such 
evidence could have been presented to the jury. Br. Appellant at 29. 
Defendant's claim is speculative, without record support, and inadequately 
briefed. This Court should not review it. 
E. Counsel has not adequately briefed Defendant's claim that the 
prosecution willfully withheld certain exculpatory tape 
recordings. 
Defendant claims that the "prosecution willfully withheld certain tape 
recordings of conversations between the defendant and the alleged victim which 
would have been exculpatory of the defendant's actions or beneficial to the 
defendant's defense." Br. Appellant at 29 (boldface and underlining omitted). 
Defendant again has not complied with the briefing requirements. While 
Defendant sets forth some law regarding the prosecutor's duty to disclose 
exculpatory evidence, he never identifies what evidence the prosecutor did not 
disclose, what that evidence would have shown, or why it might have been 
exculpatory. See Br. Appellant at 29-32. Because this claim is also speculative, 
without support in the record, and inadequately briefed, this Court should not 
review it. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm. 
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« Previous Section (76-2-104) 
Utah 
Code 
Title 76 Utah Criminal Code 





Next Section (76-2-201)» 
76-2-105. Transferred intent 
Where intentionally causing a result is an element of an offense, that element is established even if a different 
person than the actor intended was killed, injured, or harmed, or different property than the actor intended was 
damaged or otherwise affected. 
Enacted by Chapter 199, 2004 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 76 02 010500.ZIP 1,575 Bytes 
« Previous Section (76-2-104) Next Section (76-2-201)» 
Questions/Comments | Utah State Home Page | Terms of Use/Privacy Policy | ADA Notice 
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UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE Home | Site Map | Calendar | Code/Constitution | House | Senate | Search 
Title/Chapter/Section: J | GoTo ; Search Code by Key Word 
« Previous Section (76-5-101) Next Section (76-5-102.3)» 
Utah Code 
Title 76 Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 5 Offenses Against the Person 
Section
 A lx 
102 A s s a u I t 
76-5-102. Assault 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily injury to another or creates a substantial 
risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A misdemeanor if: 
(a) the person causes substantial bodily injury to another; or 
(b) the victim is pregnant and the person has knowledge of the pregnancy. 
(4) It is not a defense against assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury to another. 
Amended by Chapter 109, 2003 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 76 05_0102Q0.ZIP 1,836 Bytes 
« Previous Section (76-5-101) Next Section (76-5-102.3)» 
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Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
§ 76-5-102.7 CRIMINAL CODE 
(a) "Emergency medical service worker' ' means a person certified under 
Section 26-8a-302. 
(b) "Health care provider" has the meaning as provided in Section 
78-14-3. 
Laws 1997, c. 4, § 1, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 1999, c. 141, § 56, eff. Oct. 1, 1999. 
Library References 
Assault and Battery <3=>48 to 53. C.J.S. Assault and Battery §§ 2 to 3, 62, 64 to 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 37k48 to 7 0 , 8 1 . 
37k53. 
§ 7 6 - 5 - 1 0 2 . 8 . Disarming a peace officer 
A person is guilty of a first degree felony who intentionally takes or removes, 
or attempts to take or remove, a firearm from the person or immediate 
presence of a person he knows is a peace officer: 
(1) without the consent of the peace officer; and 
(2) while the peace officer is acting within the scope of his authority as a 
peace officer. 
Laws 1999, c. 274, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999. 
Cross References 
Attempt, elements and classification, see §§ 76-4-101 and 76-4-102. 
Conspiracy and solicitation, elements and penalties, see § 76-4-201 et seq. 
Fines upon conviction of misdemeanor or felony, see § 76-3-301. 
Inchoate offenses, limitations on sentencing, see §§ 76-4-301 and 76-4-302. 
Indigent Defense Act, see § 77-32-101 et seq. 
Penalties for felonies, see § 76-3-203. 
Rights of Crime Victims Act, see § 77-38-1 et seq. 
Right to trial by jury, see Const. Art. 1, § 10. 
Library References 
Obstructing Justice <s=*3, 7. C.J.S. Obstructing Justice or Governmental 
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 282k3; Administration §§ 4, 10, 12 to 29, 31, 32, 
282k7. 38. 
§ 7 6 - 5 - 1 0 3 . Aggravated assault 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (l)(a), 
uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other means or 
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of.Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony. 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-5-103; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 10; Laws 1989, c. 170, § 2; Laws 
1995, c. 291, § 5, eff. May 1, 1995. 
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§ 76-6-106. Criminal mischief, U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-106 (Westlaw 2008) 
U.CA. 1953 § 76-6-106 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 6. Offenses Against Property 
Part 1. Property Destruction 
§ 76-6-106. Criminal mischief 
(1) As used in this section, "critical infrastructure" includes: 
(a) information and communication systems; 
(b) financial and banking systems; 
(c) transportation systems; 
(d) any public utility service, including the power, energy, and water supply systems; 
(e) sewage and water treatment systems; 
(f) health care facilities as listed in Section 26-21-2, and emergency fire, medical, and law enforcement response systems; 
(g) public health facilities and systems; 
(h) food distribution systems; and 
(i) other government operations and services. 
(2) A person commits criminal mischief if the person: 
(a) under circumstances not amounting to arson, damages or destroys property with the intention of defrauding an insurer; 
(b) intentionally and unlawfully tampers with the property of another and as a result: 
(i) recklessly endangers: 
(A) human life; or 
(B) human health or safety; or 
(ii) recklessly causes or threatens a substantial interruption or impairment of any critical infrastructure; 
(c) intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of another; or 
(d) recklessly or willfully shoots or propels a missile or other object at or against a motor vehicle, bus, airplane, boat, 
locomotive, train, railway car, or caboose, whether moving or standing. 
(3)(a)(i) A violation of Subsection (2)(a) is a third degree felony. 
(ii) A violation of Subsection (2)(b)(i)(A) is a class A misdemeanor. 
(iii) A violation of Subsection (2)(b)(i)(B) is a class B misdemeanor. 
(iv) A violation of Subsection (2)(b)(ii) is a second degree felony. 
(b) Any other violation of this section is a: 
(i) second degree felony if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of $5,000 in 
value; 
(ii) third degree felony if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of $1,000 but 
is less than $5,000 in value; 
(iii) class A misdemeanor if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss equal to or in excess of $300 but 
is less than $1,000 in value; and 
(iv) class B misdemeanor if the actor's conduct causes or is intended to cause pecuniary loss less than $300 in value. 
(4) In determining the value of damages under this section, or for computer crimes under Section 76-6-703, the value of any 
item, computer, computer network, computer property, computer services, software, or data includes the measurable value of 
the loss of use of the items and the measurable cost to replace or restore the items. 
(5) In addition to any other penalty authorized by law, a court shall order any person convicted of any violation of this section 
to reimburse any federal, state, or local unit of government, or any private business, organization, individual, or entity for all 
expenses incurred in responding to a violation of Subsection (2)(b)(ii), unless the court states on the record the reasons why 
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§ 76-6-106. Criminal mischief, U.C.A. 1953 § 76-6-106 (Westlaw 2008) 
the reimbursement would be inappropriate. 
CREDIT(S) 
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-6-106; Laws 1992, c. 14, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 291, § 11, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 142, § 1, eff 
April 29, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 300, § 1, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 1998, c. 25, § 1, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 1999, c. 31, § 1, eff. 
May 3, 1999; Laws 2002, c. 166, § 6, eff. May 6, 2002. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Laws 2002, c. 166, rewrote this section that formerly provided: 
"(1) A person commits criminal mischief if the person: 
"(a) under circumstances not amounting to arson, damages or destroys property with the intention of defrauding an insurer; 
"(b) intentionally and unlawfully tampers with the property of another and as a result: 
"(i) recklessly endangers: 
"(A) human life; or 
"(B) human health or safety; or 
"(ii) recklessly causes or threatens a substantial interruption or impairment of: 
"(A) any public utility service; or 
"(B) any service or facility that provides communication with any public, private, or volunteer entity whose purpose is to 
respond to fire, police, or medical emergencies; 
"(c) intentionally damages, defaces, or destroys the property of another; or 
"(d) recklessly or willfully shoots or propels a missile or other object at or against a motor vehicle, bus, airplane, boat, 
locomotive, train, railway car, or caboose, whether moving or standing. 
"(2)(a) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a felony of the third degree. 
"(b) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a class A misdemeanor, except that a violation of Subsection (l)(b)(i)(B) is a class B 
misdemeanor. 
"(c) Any other violation of this section is a: 
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